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VI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20001145-CA 
vs. 
SANTIAGO A. ACOSTA-TORRES, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of child abuse, a second degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 2000), in the Third Judicial 
District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Has defendant preserved his claim that the district court erred by 
considering his deportation status at sentencing? If not, has he established "plain 
I 
error" or "exceptional circumstances"? Alternatively, is the claimed error sufficient 
to warrant review as an illegal sentence? 
If defendant has not preserved his appeal, his claim is not properly before this 
court and no standard of review applies unless he can demonstrate some exception 
to the preservation requirement, i.e., "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" 
that may result in manifest injustice. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 
P.3d 346. To establish plain error, defendant must show that the error occurred and 
that it was obvious and harmful. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 
1997). To establish "manifest injustice," defendant must show, at a minimum, a 
"truly exceptional situation[]" involving "rare procedural anomalies." State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8, 11 (Utah App. 1996); see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 12. 
Whether an appellate court may review the legality of a sentence under rule 
22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., involves the interpretation of a rule, a legal determination. 
See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). 
2. Did the district court consider defendant's status as an illegal alien when it 
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term rather than imposing a jail term 
followed by probation? If so, did the trial court violate the Supremacy Clause, due 
process, or equal protection? 
Review of a trial court's sentencing decision is for abuse of discretion. See 
State v Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). The trial court's decision 
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will be upheld unless "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). "So long as basic 
constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural fairness are afforded, the 
trial court has broad discretion in considering any and all information that 
reasonably may bear on the proper sentence." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 
(Utah App. 1997). Whether the trial court has acted consistently with constitutional 
safeguards is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. See State v. Arviso, 
1999 UT App 381, ^  5 n.4, 993 P.2d 894. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 
U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) 
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of child abuse. R. 4-5. 
Defendant pled guilty, and the State dismissed an unrelated forgery count. R. 80, 
87. The district court judge sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of 
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years. R. 107-108. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 111. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
No trial was held. This statement of the facts therefore reflects the crime and 
defendant's background as detailed in the "Official Version of the Offense" in the 
PSI. &>ePSIat2-4. 
The Crime 
The victim in this case was a three-month-old baby boy. On June 28, 2000, 
the baby's mother left him alone with defendant while she went to the store. When 
she returned, the baby had several round bruises on his face. Some of the bruises 
had trails where the baby had been slapped and the fingers had left marks. The 
baby's left ear was very swollen and bruised. The baby had a partial palm print 
above the ear and bruising over his eyes. He also had finger-shaped bruises on his 
left hip on his back above his diaper. The mother, defendant, and two friends took 
the baby to the hospital. Hospital personnel contacted police officers who came to 
the hospital, took pictures, and interviewed the four adults. Id. 
After receiving his Miranda warnings, defendant first said that the baby was 
sleeping in his car seat with a toy and that the toy must have injured him. When 
interviewed a second time, he said that he had accidentally dropped the baby, but 
did not strike him. The police officers then showed defendant the pictures of the 
baby and pointed to what appeared to be finger and hand marks on the side of the 
baby's head. Defendant then stated that the baby would not stop crying after he had 
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been dropped and so defendant "flicked" him several times on the side of his head. 
Id. 
A week later two different police officers interviewed defendant. At that time 
defendant stated that the baby was a "brat" and admitted that he did not drop the 
baby. Id, 
The baby apparently did not suffer any long term or permanent disability as a 
result. See PSI at 5. 
Defendant's Background 
Defendant, a nineteen-year-old Mexican national, came to the United States in 
1993 at the age of twelve. Id, at 11. His Utah State juvenile court records reveal 
thirty referrals with six status convictions between 1996 and 1999. Id, at 15. He 
was placed on probation as a juvenile for burglary in 1996, but transferred for 
noncompliance to Youth Corrections later that year. Id, He was released from 
Youth Corrections supervision in March 1999. Id, 
Defendant turned eighteen in April 1999, eighteen months prior to the current 
offense. During that eighteen-month period, he was convicted on one assault count. 
Id. at 10. He was also charged with forgery, the charge dismissed in connection 
with his plea in this case. Id, The PSI investigator also noted that defendant was 
"less than cooperative throughout the investigative process." Id, at 16. 
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The PSI investigator noted that the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) intended to implement deportation proceedings after sentencing. Id. She 
observed that the agency was concerned about defendant's previous assault charge 
and his failure to cooperate. She stated that "defendant would have been an 
appropriate candidate for probation after a lengthy period of jail," but observed that 
INS deportation plans limited the options available to Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P). Id. She therefore recommended that defendant be sentenced to the 
indeterminate prison term prescribed by law and, upon parole, be placed in INS 
custody for deportation. Id. at 17. 
The Sentencing Hearing 
The district court judge, after hearing from defendant, the prosecutor, and 
defense counsel and after viewing the photographs of the injured baby, sentenced 
defendant to the indeterminate prison term. R. 167:7. The judge stated, "I am not 
of the view that the recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone 
that would beat up on a child of this nature, in my estimation, really needs some 
serious thinking time." Id. The judge further reasoned, "I am concerned that you 
might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and endanger some other innocent 
victim out in society." Id. He did not mention defendant's status as an illegal alien 
or INS deportation plans. See id. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant has not preserved his claim that the district court erred by 
considering his deportation status at sentencing. While defendant stated that he was 
"bothered" by the portions of the PSI linking AP&P's prison recommendation to 
INS deportation plans, he did not object to the district court's sentence or clearly 
and specifically state any ground for objection. Defendant did not mention the 
Supremacy Clause, due process, or equal protection, let alone specify them as 
grounds for objection. Further, defendant has not demonstrated "plain error" or 
"exceptional circumstances" to justify review in the absence of preservation. 
Finally, because the claimed error does not render the sentence illegal, defendant 
cannot obtain review under rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P. 
2. Defendant's claim also fails on the merits. First, defendant has not 
demonstrated that the district court judge considered defendant's illegal status or 
INS deportation plans when he imposed sentence. Second, even if he did, 
consideration of those factors does not violate the Supremacy Clause, due process, 




DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM AND HAS NOT 
SHOWN "PLAIN ERROR" OR "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES"; 
MOREOVER, HE CANNOT OBTAIN REVIEW UNDER RULE 22(e) 
BECAUSE HIS SENTENCE IS NOT ILLEGAL 
A. Defendant has not preserved this issue and has demonstrated no exception 
to the preservation requirement. 
Defendant argues that the district court based defendant's sentence, in part, on 
his status as an illegal alien subject to deportation, in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause, due process, and equal protection. Br. Aplt. at 7-20. 
Defendant did not preserve these grounds for objection. "'Trial counsel must 
state clearly and specifically all grounds for objection.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 
(Utah 1993)). Indeed, "[t]he objection must "'be specific enough to give the trial 
court notice of the very error' of which counsel complains.'" Bryant, 965 P.2d at 
546 (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 
1996) (citation omitted)). 
Defendant's only reference to this issue below was a comment by defense 
counsel at sentencing. Noting that the PSI investigator had recommended prison, 
defense counsel stated that he was "bother[ed]" by statements in the PSI about INS 
deportation plans and defendant's candidacy for probation. R. 167:3-4. Defendant 
did not, however, object to the inclusion of the material in the PSI or argue that the 
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district court's consideration of the information was improper, let alone 
unconstitutional. He did not refer to the Supremacy Clause, to due process, or to 
equal protection. Defendant's statement that he was bothered by the evaluative 
summary was insufficient to give the court notice of the errors he now claims are 
preserved for review. 
Defendant also argues in a footnote that he is entitled to review, even absent 
preservation, on the basis of "plain error" and "exceptional circumstances." Br. 
Aplt. at 20 n.2. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (i) an error 
occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error was harmful. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Error is not obvious "where there is no 
settled appellate law to guide the trial court." See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 
(UtahApp. 1997). 
No appellate case law forbids consideration of a defendant's illegal 
immigration status or his pending deportation. Cases cited by defendant, State v. 
Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, and State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), are 
inapposite. 
In Arviso, this Court held that a trial court erred when it suspended a prison 
term on the condition that the defendant not reenter this country. Id. This action 
interfered with the exclusive federal power over admission and exclusion of aliens. 
9 
Id. at fflf 6-7. It did not forbid consideration of the ways in which the federal 
exercise of that power might affect a sentence. 
Johnson merely held that sentencing may not be based on unreliable evidence. 
856 P.2d at 1071. The unreliable evidence in Johnson was a report, consisting of 
triple hearsay, summarizing the statements of a four-year-old child. 856 P.2d at 
1070-71. 
Nothing in either case suggested that illegal alienage or imminent deportation 
was an improper or unreliable sentencing consideration. Defendant has not 
demonstrated that error, if any, was obvious, and thus has not met the plain error 
standard. 
Defendant also argues "exceptional circumstances." Defendant cites State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted), holding that "unique 
procedural circumstances . . . permit consideration of the merits of [certain] issues 
on appeal" even though they were not raised below. Defendant argues that, absent 
appellate review, manifest justice would occur here because "defense counsel 
alerted the trial judge to a concern with imposing a harsher sentence based on 
deportation status." Br. Aplt. at 21 n.2. Defendant effectively argues, contrary to 
precedent, that specific grounds for an objection are unnecessary where defendant 
notifies the court that something is troublesome or that it "bothers" him. 
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Moreover, defendant does not detail any "unique procedural circumstance" 
militating in favor of review of this unpreserved issue. 
Thus, the issue was not preserved. Neither has defendant demonstrated an 
exception to the preservation requirement. This claim is therefore not properly 
before this court. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 11 ("preservation rule applies to 
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate 
that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred"). 
B. The sentence imposed was not illegal. 
Defendant argues alternatively that "even if the claims were not preserved, this 
Court can correct the illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)." Br. 
I 
Aplt. at 20. Defendant cites State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859-860 (Utah 1995), 
as authority that "an appellate court can vacate an illegal sentence even if the claim 
is raised for the first time on appeal." Br. Aplt. at 20. 
Brooks does permit vacation of an illegal sentence on appeal. Defendant cites 
no authority, however, in support of his implicit argument that the sentence imposed 
in this case is an illegal sentence. 
Rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal 
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."1 The rule 
!Rule 22(e) was enacted as statute in 1980 and codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-35-22(e). See 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1. As with other statutory rules of procedure 
and evidence contained in the code, rule 22(e) was repealed as statute and adopted as a 
(continued...) 
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codified precedent established by Utah courts permitting review of sentences so 
"obviously illegal" that "it would . . . be unconscionable not to examine the issue." 
See Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1977). These included sentences 
imposed by a court having no jurisdiction, sentences not authorized by law, and 
sentences "of an entirely different character than that which the statute prescribes." 
Id. 
Since 1980, Utah courts have held or reasoned that illegal sentences may occur 
in the following circumstances: 
• The sentence provides a punishment that does not conform to the statutes 
governing the crime of conviction. See State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 
545, 551 (Utah 1996) (statute "d[id] not authorize a consecutive, 
determinate two-year [enhancement] term"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 
(Utah 1991), 86-88 (sentence to indeterminate term was illegal and void 
where statute mandated minimum mandatory sentence; corrected sentence 
was lawful, even though harsher); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389-
90 (1988) (sentence to indeterminate term with recommended maximum 
was illegal where statute requires a minimum mandatory term); State v. 
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, ffl| 6, 14, 14 P.3d 129 (under statute in effect 
^...continued) 
court rule in 1990. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35 (repealed) (1999 Replacement Part); 
Compiler's Notes, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (2001). 
12 
at the time of sentencing, trial court should have sentenced for 
misdemeanors, not felonies); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653-654 
(Utah App. 1997) (statute did not authorize trial court order that 
defendant's property be sold to satisfy restitution); State v. Montoya, 929 
P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1996) (statute "d[id] not empower the trial 
court to impose a determinate sentence exceeding one year"); State v. 
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1994) (one-year jail sentence 
was illegal where statute mandated indeterminate one to fifteen year 
term). 
The sentence is ambiguous. See Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah 
App. 1992) (judge's oral pronouncement referred to "aggravated burglary, 
a third degree felony," where statute treated aggravated burglary as a first 
degree felony). 
• The trial court lacks jurisdiction. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation 
where defendant was not charged with probation violation within his 
original probation term). 
Utah courts have also held or reasoned that alleged errors do not constitute 
illegal sentences in the following circumstances: 
• The defendant challenges the conviction, not the sentence. See State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (merger claim was challenge 
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to conviction, not to sentence; review under rule 22(e) was error); State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858, 860 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address 
defendant's argument that 'his convictions for robbery and burglary 
illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime," appellate court stated 
that it could not "review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when 
the substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, 
but to the underlying conviction"); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 
(Utah App. 1991) (argument that defendant was convicted for conduct 
prohibited both by arson and aggravated arson statutes was not a 
challenge to the imposition of an incorrect and therefore void sentence 
and could not be raised for the first time on appeal); see also State v. 
Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994) (argument that mens rea for 
second degree murder and manslaughter did not differ and that defendant 
should have been sentenced to the lesser manslaughter penalty was not a 
challenge to an illegal sentence that could be corrected at any time under 
rule 22(e)). 
The trial court bases its sentencing on inappropriate factors. State v. 
Wareham, 801 P.2d 918, 919-920 & n.2 (Utah 1990) (defendant asserted 
that sentencing enhancement was based on aggravating factors committed 
prior to the date of the enhancement statute and therefore in violation of 
ex post facto protections; court held that this issue should have been 
14 
raised on appeal and that it did not constitute an illegal sentence under 
rule 22(e)).2 
Defendant's claimed error does not constitute an illegal sentence under Utah 
law. His sentence is not similar to those Utah courts have declared illegal. The 
trial court did not impose a statutorily unauthorized sentence. The sentence was not 
ambiguous. Jurisdiction was not lacking. 
Although the illegal sentence issue arose in a different procedural context, 
defendant's case most closely resembles Wareham, 801 P.2d at 918. Wareham filed 
a motion to reduce his sentence following an unsuccessful first appeal. Id. at 919. 
Although observing that an illegal sentence could be challenged at anytime, the 
Wareham court refused to address defendant's claim, holding that it should have 
been brought on appeal, i.e., on Wareham's first appeal. Id. at 919 n.3, 920. Like 
defendant in the instant case, Wareham alleged that the trial court based its 
sentencing on an inappropriate factor. Id. at 919-920. Like defendant, Wareham 
alleged a constitutional violation. Id. 
Here, while defendant raises this issue as part of his first appeal, he attempts to 
circumvent the normal appellate process by alleging that his sentence is illegal. 
While the procedural posture differs, Wareham's analysis is controlling here. An 
2But cf. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 6 n.l, 975 P.2d 476 (stating in dicta 
that ex post facto claim based on resentencing after completion of original sentence and 
voluntary withdrawal of plea would be proper under rule 22(e)). 
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allegation that a sentence is based on an inappropriate, even unconstitutional, factor 
does not render the sentence illegal. 
Further, as a matter of policy, this court should not treat defendant's alleged 
error as an illegal sentence. In determining what kinds of errors constitute illegal 
sentences, courts must attempt to "balance the need for the finality of convictions 
and sentences with the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve 
sentences imposed contrary to the requirements of law." Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 
1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001); see also State v. Murray, 744 A.2d 131, 134 (N.J. 2000).3 
Several consequences attach to the classification of a sentencing error as an 
illegal sentence. First, an illegal sentence is reviewable at any time, a characteristic 
affecting the finality of judgments. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Further, because 
3Florida and New Jersey courts have systematically addressed the definition of 
illegal sentences. Florida courts have defined an "illegal sentence" as a sentence that 
"imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes 
could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances." Carter, 786 So.2d at 1181. 
Examples include sentences that exceed the maximum statutory period for a particular 
offense or that fail to credit a defendant with jail time served. Id. A sentence is not 
illegal simply because it encompasses a "patent sentencing error[]." Id. 
In New Jersey, a sentence "in excess of or otherwise not in accordance" with 
statutory mandates is illegal. Murray, 744 A.2d at 134. A sentence may also be illegal 
where "it was not imposed in accordance with law." Id. at 135. A sentence may fail, for 
instance, to satisfy required statutory presentencing conditions and, as a result, its 
imposition would not be in accordance with law. Id. In New Jersey, where statute 
prohibits the confinement of a defendant in a youth correctional facility after he has 
served a prison sentence, sentencing to a youth facility can constitute a sentence "not 
imposed in accordance with law." Id. Likewise, where statutory law mandates a term of 
parole ineligibility, a sentence that fails to include that term is "not imposed in accordance 
with law." Id. 
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an illegal sentence is a void sentence, a new sentence imposed after vacation of an 
illegal sentence is not restricted by the terms of the illegal sentence and may be 
harsher. See Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. Indeed, the State (not just the defendant) may 
seek vacation of an illegal sentence. The State may claim, for instance, that the the 
punishment imposed is less severe than the punishment statutorily mandated. See 
id. at 86. In light of these factors, courts have carefully restricted the kinds of 
sentencing errors that may render a sentence illegal. 
Under Utah law, a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a "sentence that does not 
conform to the crime of which the defendant has been convicted" or a sentence 
"imposed in an illegal manner." State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994). 
It is a "patently" or "facially illegal" sentence. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860 
("patently illegal"); Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654 ("patently illegal"); see also 
Edwards v. State, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (Nev. 1996) ("facially illegal"); 
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 661 A.2d 6, 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("patently 
illegal"). In other words, the sentence's illegality will usually be apparent upon 
review of the relevant statutes, the conviction, and the sentence itself—without 
recourse to other portions of the record—because the terms and conditions of the 
punishment for that offense are impermissible as a matter of law. 
In the instant case, defendant alleges that the trial court considered an 
impermissible factor in rendering its decision. Defendant did not object to the 
error, thereby preserving his claim for appellate review. He now asks this Court to 
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review the alleged sentencing error as an illegal sentence. Should he prevail and 
should this Court determine that the district court inappropriately considered 
defendant's deportation status, that decision would open the door to multitudinous 
claims of such error, raisable "at any time." Further, it would open the door to 
claims by the State that trial courts have erred in imposing sentences that are too 
lenient because they inappropriately considered (or failed to consider) some factor. 
These issues are appropriate for appeal, not for correction under rule 22(e). 
Alleged errors of this kind are not patently in violation of statute. They are not the 
kinds of errors that have traditionally merited review as possibly illegal sentences. 
This Court should decline defendant's invitation to review the alleged error in this 
case under rule 22(e). 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO THE 
STATUTORY INDETERMINATE PRISON TERM 
Should this Court determine that review is proper, defendant's claim 
nonetheless fails on the merits. The record does not demonstrate that the district 
court based its sentencing on defendant's status as an illegal alien. In any event, 
consideration of defendant's status as an illegal alien subject to deportation does not 
violate the Supremacy Clause, due process, or equal protection. 
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A. The record does not demonstrate that the district court based its 
sentencing decision on defendant's status as an illegal alien. 
Defendant argues that the district court "abused [its] discretion by sentencing 
appellant to prison based in part on his immigration status," i.e., "on the fact that 
[the] INS planned to deport [him]." Br. Aplt. at 7. The record does not support 
this assertion. 
The PSI investigator recommended that defendant be sentenced to prison. PSI 
at 17. That recommendation was, in fact, based in part on defendant's immigration 
status. The investigator was concerned about defendant's assault offense and his 
lack of cooperation during preparation of the PSI. Id. at 16. She noted that 
defendant desired counseling for anger management and, under other circumstances, 
would have been "an appropriate candidate for probation after a lengthy period of 
jail." Id. She observed, however, that AP&P's options were "limited" by the INS 
plans to deport defendant. Id. Apparently, once released from jail, deportation 
proceedings would begin, precluding a supervised probation that might include 
anger management counseling. 
Nothing in the record suggests that the district court judge adopted the PSI 
investigator's reasoning. At sentencing, the judge gave defendant, defense counsel, 
and the prosecutor the opportunity to speak. R. 167:3-7. The judge also received 
photographs of the injured baby, victim impact statements from the baby's mother 
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and grandmother, and the PSI. Id. at 3-5. Based on the evidence before him, the 
judge sentenced defendant to prison. Id. at 7. 
The judge's only reference to the PSI was this: "Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not 
of the view that the recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate." Id. at 7. The 
judge's statement reflects only that, like AP&P, he felt that the prison term was 
appropriate. It does not indicate that the judge found the sentence appropriate 
because of the INS deportation plans. 
Rather, the trial judge's explanatory comments show that he considered the 
offense sufficiently severe to merit prison and that he imposed a prison term for that 
very reason. He said, "Indeed, anyone that would beat up on a child of this nature, 
in my estimation, really needs some serious thinking time, and I am concerned that 
you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and endanger some other 
innocent victim out of society." Id. He then concluded, "I am therefore of the 
view, Mr. Acosta-Torres, that you ought to be committed to the Utah State Prison, 
and I'll order that to be accomplished forthwith." Id. at 8. The judge expressed 
no other reason for imposing a prison term. Defendant has not demonstrated, and it 
would be inappropriate to presume, that the sentence was based on defendant's 
immigration status.4 
4Where the record is "silent" on an issue, an appellate court "assume[s] regularity 
in the proceedings below." State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983) (record 
silent on issue); see also State v. Wuljfenstein, 657 P.2d 389, 293 (Utah 1982) (defendant 
did not raise claim below and therefore issue did not appear in the record, making 
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B. Even if the district court considered defendant's status as an illegal alien 
subject to deportation, consideration of that factor did not violate any 
constitutional safeguard. 
Defendant argues that imposition of the prison term, allegedly based in part on 
defendant's status as an illegal alien, violated the Supremacy Clause of the federal 
constitution and defendant's rights to both due process and equal protection under 
the law. Br. Aplt. at 6-7.5 Defendant misapprehends the reach of the Supremacy 
Clause. Defendant has uemonstrated no violation of his due process and equal 
protection rights. 
1. Supremacy Clause 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, makes 
federal law binding on the states. State action, if incompatible with the legitimate 
exercise of federal power, loses its validity, even if taken within a sphere in which 
the state might otherwise act. See License Cases, 5 How. 504, 538 (U.S. 1847), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). 
When determining whether state action violates the Supremacy Clause, a 
court's "primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of [the] 
particular case, [the state action] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
defendant's assignment or error "a unilateral allegation which the review court ha[d] no 
power to determine"), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991); State v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 910-911 (Utah 1968) (where record is unclear 
as to what happened in trial court, appellate court presumes that the proceedings "were 
conducted according to law"). 
5Defendant places no reliance on the Utah Constitution. See Br. Aplt at 6-7. 
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execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Goldstein v. California, 
412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
Defendant here argues that the district court judge violated the Supremacy 
Clause when he factored INS plans to deport defendant into his sentencing decision. 
Br. Aplt. at 8-9. Assuming for purposes of this argument that the judge did 
consider the INS plans, defendant has not demonstrated that doing so "constituted 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of any Congressional purpose or 
objective. Nor can he. 
Defendant argues, citing Arviso, 1999 UT App 38, at f 7, that "[b]asing a 
sentence in a state case on a belief that the INS plans to deport the individual 
improperly steps into the federal immigration arena, thereby violating the 
Supremacy Clause." Br. Aplt. at 9. In Arviso, the trial court suspended a 
defendant's prison terms on the condition that the defendant not return to the United 
States. The defendant was later deported, but returned to Utah after a short time. 
The trial court consequently lifted the sentence suspension and reimposed the prison 
term. Because the conditional sentence interfered with the Congressional objective 
to assign "the sole power to exclude aliens" to the United States Attorney General, 
this Court concluded that the trial court had "trespassed into forbidden INS 
territory, violating the Supremacy Clause." Id. at f^ f 6-7. 
The instant case is easily distinguishable. Here, the district court did not 
impose any order excluding or admitting an alien. The court did nothing to 
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interfere with Congressional mandates on immigration. If the district court 
considered the INS plans to deport defendant, it did merely that—it looked at the 
probable federal action with respect to defendant and imposed a sentence 
appropriate to accomplish state objectives in light of that federal action. 
The sentence imposed did not "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" merely because it 
considered the probable federal treatment of defendant. Imposition of a prison 
sentence or even the jail sentence defendant favors could interfere with INS action 
only if the confinement of any person subject to deportation constituted a violation 
of the Supremacy Clause. Defendant does not make that argument or point to any 
case law or INS policy suggesting that the confinement of alien convicts interferes 
with INS power to institute deportation proceedings and/or to deport. 
2. Due Process 
Defendant argues that a sentence based on any consideration of defendant's 
status as an illegal alien violates due process. Br. Aplt. at 10-15. Defendant 
misapprehends the law, and his cited cases are inapposite. 
Defendant cites several cases holding that a sentencing decision based on 
nationality, ethnicity, or alien status violates due process guarantees. See United 
States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Onwuemene, 
933 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 
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1352 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986). 
The State does not argue that a sentence based on those factors is permissible. 
The question is rather whether a sentencing court may consider a defendant's 
illegal entry and/or his being subject to imminent deportation proceedings. Three of 
defendant's cited cases, Leung, Onwuemene, and Borrero-Isaza, do not mention 
illegal entry or status. In Leung, the trial judge made two remarks suggesting that 
the length of the defendant's sentence was based in part on her ethnic origin and 
alien status. 40 F.3d at 585. In Onwuemene, the trial judge imposed a sentence at 
the high end of the guideline range because the defendant was not a citizen of the 
United States. 933 F.2d at 651. In Borrero-Isaza, the trial judge enhanced the 
defendant's sentence because he came from Columbia, a drug "source country." 
887 F.2d at 1351. Nothing in these opinions, however, suggests that any of the 
defendants had entered this country illegally. 
Defendant also cites United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 
1986). See Br. Aplt at 11. Noting that "[a]n illegal alien comes within the scope of 
the word 'person' guaranteed due process," the Gomez court nevertheless held that 
the sentencing court could properly consider the defendant's illegal alien status. 
"[T]he illegal act of an alien [entering this country] is entitled to no more deference 
than some other prior illegal act of a citizen also being sentenced for a drug 
violation." Gomez, 797 F.2d at 420. A sentencing judge need not "shut his eyes to 
the reality of the factual situation before him and pretend that the defendant is not 
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an illegal alien iron: * . tombia who has pleaded guilty to a drug violation, " ' i \ / at 
1 II"111 llllit iinli'i |iin|ii ill;, I ntisidciai, its pail Il Ihr ' ichahk .tinl pulinriit 
::: '^ *r\--\ wmch might reasonably bear on the sentencing decision," that the 
:• ;vnaam \.i: x here illegally." Id at 419, 420 
Gomez is consistent with abundant precedent holding that a sentencing court 
e 
carefully, their having violated or disregarded immigration laws. See People v. 
Sanchez, 235 Cal Rptr. 264, 267-278 (Cal Ct , \pp. 1987) (sentencing court: did 
not violate fecit;,:, .u^i ,.T state guarantees of equal protection or due process when 
• h*-- ' i - linn st.ilir in dt'iiMny |ihiliiitn • '* v. 
Kjn^ed States, 704 A.2d Slo, 819 \D.C. 2001) (sentencing court necu nut "close its 
eyes to the defendant's status as an illegal alien and his history of violating the law , 
•;...iading an> • av^  ;e;aicd trk immigration \: I i *< ; i
 ( :i i " 5 tate, 532 So.2d i; 43. / 1 6 
Pendant's] 
illegal status in the country as a i::a ^uon ot hi* .iagiant disregard for the laws 
of this country and a clear and convincing reason for [sentencing] departure"); State 
] \ \i ineno, 4J",11 I I \\ M M1 (>.' M iNrb I^ XKl ihaillnit MIL unit pinpcily 
considered lack of respect for the law, based in part on the defendant's having 
entered c^ur* y illegally on several occasions); People v. Kaplan, 606 N.Y.S..2d 
1
 ^
1 1 C 1 1 52 \ Y, App ™Tr 1 0 c m '"~ourt is entitled to consider offenses for 
State v. Morales-Aguilar, 855 P.2d 646 (Or. App. 1993) (sentencing court may 
consider defendant's unwillingness to conform his conduct to legal requirements as 
evidenced by defendant's illegal residency). 
Defendant has not pointed to case law holding that a sentencing court violates 
due process when it considers a defendant's having entered the country illegally or, 
as some courts have phrased it, a defendant's status as an illegal alien.6 Further, 
abundant precedent supports the contrary position, i.e., that a court may properly 
and constitutionally consider those factors in its sentencing determinations. 
Defendant has not demonstrated a violation of due process. 
3. Equal Protection 
Defendant argues that "sentencing [defendant] to prison based on his status as 
an illegal alien violates equal protection because it does not serve a state interest, 
substantial or otherwise." Br. Aplt. at 18 (emphasis in original). Assuming again 
for purposes of this argument that the district court sentenced defendant to prison 
because of INS deportation plans, this action does not violate defendant's equal 
6Defendant points to only one case where the defendants were clearly illegal 
immigrants. See Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1998). The reviewing court stated 
that a sentencing decision based, "in part, upon [the defendants'] status as illegal aliens," 
violates their due process rights. Id. at 145. The case is, however, distinguishable. The 
Martinez court referred to the trial court's action as considering interchangeably the 
defendants' "status as illegal aliens," their "national origin," their "nationality," and their 
"foreign nationality." Id. at 145-146. The court never addressed the issue of illegal entry, 
and the case turned on a trial court remark about "people [who] come from foreign 
countries." Id. at 145. 
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protection rigius * i.documented aliens do not constitute a suspect class. / 3I" \y der \ \ 
Ikh "I 1 ' I I '. 'II.1 "I \ 11 1-224 ( I 'MJi Mm ill i i lnni i t i ia i t r tJ lUvm fat in* 
deportation. The State can and need only show that its action, i.e., the sentencing in 
this case, was rationally related to the attainment of a legitimate state interest, such 
as punishment, deterrence, rehabiliation, and/or protection of society. 
The hqiiiil Mrotn/tioii I Xiiist1' ml fllin11 Hnitrd States l.'onslilulinn Inrlnds Strife 
action der* ^ inv person "the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST., amend. 
XIV, r I tn rher * .*i\i* ' " ects that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall 
be treated aliKw. ruur > , ui. 5 5 ' I J S. at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
""P s not i eqi iir 5 things ( 1 11< 11 .11r i i n f t V j r n i l 111 III.n• I m 
\ if iua to be created in law as though they were the same." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) The State and, in this case, its judiciary have "[t]he initial 
i».' o determine what io uni; ^i^ . he <;ame - .; 
lish classifications ite the nature 
of the problem perceived. *». 
The State may make classifications to further its interests: it may. ?or •;stance, 
l icdl \ i in in in I,I II iiliiflt/fTiiill, I II in in ii in ill in i i i i i i i i i i i ls i i i i i ! iiiiiiiilcn,1!'1. i l i l te tv i i t ! , 11(11111111 
shoplifters. For the most part, the classifications the State makes need onl> "bear[] 
some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose/' 7 ' In other words, the 
classification must relate rationally to the attainment ••; 1 ..dtimate state interest. 
if m m / Suitv* Ii"" H Hi 1 "I" ' ni I 1 1 I S I ' I 1 :> I I ' W l l l , c r i / / s . Htuih 
ofTrs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, , 121 S.Ct. 955, 963-
964 (2001) (rational basis review, "applicable to general social and economic 
legislation," requires only "rational relationship between the disparity of treatment 
and some legitimate governmental purpose"). Courts review most classifications 
deferentially. See id. at 964 (any rational basis suffices; State need not articulate 
reasoning; burden on challenging party to negative "any reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification"). 
Classifications based on certain "suspect classes," such as race, alienage, and 
national origin, however, must be more carefully drawn: they must be "narrowly 
tailored to the achievement of a compelling state interest." See Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (articulating standard for 
federal racial classifications); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-494 
(1989) (articulating standard for race-based action by state and local governments). 
The courts strictly scrutinize state action based on these classifications. 
Finally, certain "quasi-suspect" classifications require intermediate or 
"heightened" scrutiny. These include classifications based on gender and 
legitimacy. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2059 (2001) (gender); 
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (legitimacy). These classifications are 
constitutional only if they "further[] a substantial interest of the State." Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 217-218. This standard has been applied to one case involving illegal 
aliens, Plyler, cited by defendant. Id.; see Br. Aplt. at 15-18. Plyler applied 
28 
"heightened scrutiny" to a classification burdening school children who were illegal 
aliens Inil Jul ii I i st.ilili .It 'illegal aliens" .is i 1141111 ' '»' "|iuasi--sus|»et I ila ^ r ' 
I I S at 223-224, 230. 
In Plyler the Supreme Court: he; i unconstitutional a Texas statute withholding 
state funds for the education of children not legallv admitted into the country. The 
ilia I Li It* alsu aiillllini \i eill lot ill i 114 M ill ilistiitits lo <i 
those children. The Court concluded that the sta'tute did not further any "substantial 
-rate interest** and therefore "[could] hardly be considered rational," Id. at 223-224. 
. MI K wun j r , iou However, mandate the application of strict or ne..- ' ^1 scrutiny 
i i i i iv i II 'iiiiiiiL , i l l le i i - . i l l i i II I i "I ii:1- ill Il ! ,1 in I; III 1 / i , ill 
the litetime hardship" that denying education would inflict "on a discrete class of 
children not accountable for their disabling status," the burden created by the 
classification \\ ould be iixational unless it sfurther[ed] some substantial goal of the 
State '' "»i I at 223 -224. 
The Plyler court observed, moreover, that "undocumented status is not 
irrelevant to any legislative goal" and is, except in the case of children, "the product 
11I 1 o n u 1 o i l s in II mi i l l Mill in 11 in lLi 1 II mi 1 II i i III ill mi1 ill 11 II II n e i c t ( m i a l l I I M S I M I I I n 1 u s e n f 
adults, classifications that burden illegal aliens need only "bear[] some fair 
relationship to a legitimate public purpose," Id. at 216. Likewise, classifications 
;nj; burden lUegal aliens facing pending deportation need only be rationally related 
. " • . . • • . •• 11 • . • ' 
Defendant argues that defendant's status as an illegal alien or as an illegal 
alien facing deportation is irrelevant to any legitimate state interest. Defendant's 
status is, however, relevant to a variety of legitimate interests. The State has a 
legitimate interest in punishing lawbreakers, rehabilitating them, deterring others 
from criminal behavior, and protecting society. See Bear den v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 
660, 671 (1983). 
A defendant's status as an illegal alien is rationally related to the imposition or 
denial of probation. A defendant facing deportation will, in most cases, be deported 
shortly after his release from custody. To sentence a defendant in that posture to a 
jail term, to be followed by probation, means that the defendant will serve only the 
jail time. Deportation will follow his release from custody, and no meaningful 
probation will be possible. The defendant will not be present for supervision and 
required counseling. He will not be available for return to custody if he violates 
probation conditions. In effect, defendant will simply serve a reduced sentence. A 
court deciding between an indeterminate prison term and a briefer jail sentence 
followed by probation is, in reality, choosing only between the indeterminate prison 
term and the briefer jail sentence. 
Because meaningful probation is impossible, defendant's status as an illegal 
alien who may or will be deported, is rationally related to the State's legitimate 
interests in punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and the protection of society. 
The State's interest in deterring criminal activity generally requires imposition of a 
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sentence sufficiently severe to discourage others from, committing an offense. 
Fill the! , tl le punishment jppiu|iiuk Uu ,i ttilaiii utlense b. ycueialU iniaiitLikul li 
State ' •• •- **- M'iv u:- • w nterest in imposing that punishment unless it 
determines that its interests are better met through a induced sentence followed b> 
probation. Finally, the State has an interest in rehabilitating the crimj'nal who may, 
iilhcil illegally loenti i lln minli III nil llin >i inlui 1 in i nmiih'hrnilnl ii! III 
State's interest in protecting society from criminal activity in general and from 
defendant, whose deportation may not effect his permanent removal, specifically. 
' I hey are not only legitimate State interests but substantial state interests. See S tate 
because
 Lthe deft 11VJ.CIJ.11J l l i v C d immediate deportation, imposition oi the 
presumptive probationary sentence would not accomplish the goals of the [sentence] 
2UiuCiine*'); *ee ahu t t^;-u ,\. \ . . _J*. <, ... ,i^utdi * r • inon 
, v i ^ - »' 
"[ojb\iou5>l>, a convicted illegal —u» 1~*QIA, 4-v . . dcpuruuuii, Aouid be unable it 
comply with any terms and conditions of probation beyond the serving of any 
period I'll local in aitieiatiiiii inipo'icJ"). 
Consideration of defendant's status is rationally related to these interests. 
Defendant's equal protection challenges fail under either a rational basis test or an 
intermediate scrutiny test. 
C. Should this court vacate defendant's sentence, remand to the sentencing 
judge is appropriate-
Defendant argues that his sentence should be vacated and this case remanded 
for resentencing before a different judge. Br. Aplt. at 21. Defendant cites three 
cases where a trial judge improperly based a sentence on alienage and the reviewing 
court remanded to a different judge—Leung, 40 F.3d at 587, Martinez v. State, 961 
P.2d 143, 146 (Nev. 1998); and Kalbali v. State, 636 P.2d 369, 371 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1981). In each of these cases, the trial judge made comments about aliens that 
implied prejudice. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 585 ("[w]e have enough home-grown 
criminals in the United States without importing them"; "[t]he purpose of my 
sentence here is to . . . deter others, particularly others in the Asiatic community"); 
Martinez, 961 P.2d at 145 ("[tjhere's something that heightens the nature of an 
offense when people come from foreign lands to do offenses in another land"); 
Kalbali, 636 P.2d at 370 (judge "was not going to spend the taxpayer's money of 
this State to rehabilitate somebody from Iran"). The reviewing courts therefore 
remanded to a different judge to satisfy "the appearance of justice." Leung, 40 F.3d 
at 587. 
The judge in this case did nothing to suggest that he harbored any 
discriminatory animus toward aliens or that his sentence was based on defendant's 
foreign nationality. The above cases are inapposite. Remand to the trial judge is 
appropriate and in no way inconsistent with "the appearance of justice." 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant1 s conviction shouiu i^ ailirmed Mii-no i;.s sentence ix- wuaicd, 
icnum! -.In nil I In I i Ilit1 sniilnn ni|f iinli'i1 
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu 
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in dt-ienaahi • 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If v, 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest, may h<-
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) "When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imp<---"i m v-
illegal manner, at any time 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the umi i ^ i ., IUM-
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Cn<\p If t he court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a 
shall so specify in the sentencing order, 
(Amended effective January 1 , 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
tioning. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 999 P.2d 
565. 
Verdict forms. 
There is no statute in this state requiring the 
court to prepare forms of verdict. It has, how-
ever, been the general practice of trial courts to 
do that , and it might be that, when they under-
. . . .m-i 'AJ . 
Am. Jur. 2d. —- ,;itiAi:i -;«ir \ia Trial $ i".' n) 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 23A C .1 S. * Vimmal Law $ 139." ~t 
seq. 
AX.R. — Inconsistency of criminal verdict as 
between two or more defendants tried together, 
22A.L.R.3d717. 
Juror's reluctant, equivocal, or conditional 
assent to verdict, on polling, as ground for 
Rule 21.5. Repealed. 
Repea l s . — Rule 21.5, establishing proce-
dure for pleas claiming mental illness or insan-
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 70 
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one 
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate, 
ARTICLE v i 
[MISCELLANEOUS PR* ">VIS ft :.\> 
[Assumpt ion of pub l i c d e b t — S u p r e m e Law -- * -.nh of 
office — Rel igious tests prohibited.! 
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, 
before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid 
against the United States under this Constitution, as under 
the Confederation. 
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing. 
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and 
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to 
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under 
the United States. 
ARTICLE VII 
[ADOPTION1 
[Rat i f icat ion —Attestat ion. 1 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between 
the States so ratifying the same. Done in Convention by the 
unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day 
of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven 
hundred and eighty seven, and of the independence of the 
United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we 
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In t ii-ii Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
Newr Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Ilamilton 
from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. 
Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United 
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of 
this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a 
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People 
thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for 
their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention 
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice 
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as 
soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this 
Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should 
fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States 
which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the 
Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the 
Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Con-
stitution. That after such Publication the Electors, should be 
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: 
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the 
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes 
certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution 
requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress 
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should 
convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators 
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose 
of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; 
and. that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with 
ih" President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
*: ritution. 
~_T ihe Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
A 1 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Sect ion 1. [Slavery p roh ib i t ed . ] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t ] 




1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the < <>n:Wi 
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. (C i t i zensh ip — Due p r o c e s s of l aw — Equa l 
p ro tec t ion . ] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [ R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — P o w e r to redu.ce a p p o i n t 
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec . 3. [Disqual i f ica t ion to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec . 4. [Publ ic deb t not to be q u e s t i o n e d — Debts of 
t he Confede racy a n d c la ims no t to be pa id . ] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payiiient of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but ail such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article, 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color r. * : ' - I 
2, [Power to enforce amendment.] 
*M*iti.**« w.w, • — Kace or oior 
ifv.i 
n-.r r]>::.* t .mzens oi me United States to vote shall not be 
lt-nit l *r abridged by the United States or by any State on 
;•.count of race color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ] 




The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes oi 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion 
ment among the several States, and without regard to an; 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of tw 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for si 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors i 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electo: 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any Sta 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issi 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That tl 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vaca 
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect t 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes va 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMEN I 
XXI, SECTION 1.] 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Sec t ion 1, [Nat iona l p roh ib i t i on T r ' o x i r a t i n g 
quors . ] 
After one year from the ratification of this article 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liqi 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation the 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 15, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah versus Acosta-Torres, 
4 Santiago, case No. CR-002118. Mr. Buividas -
5 MR. BUIVIDAS: That's correct. 
6 THE COURT: — you are appearing on behalf of this 
7 defendant, and Ms. Higgins — 
8 MS. HIGGINS: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: -- for the State? 
10 MS. HIGGINS: Yes, your Honor. 
11 MR. BUIVTDAS: If I may, your Honor, I have some 
12 letters for the Court. 
13 THE COURT: Yes, you may, certainly. You are Santiago 
14 Acosta-Torres; is that correct? 
15 MR. ACOSTA-TORRES: Yes, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Buividas is here as your lawyer; is 
17 that correct? 
18 MR. ACOSTA-TORRES: Yes, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: For the record, this is the time set for 
20 sentencing. The defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 13 
21 of November of this year to the second-degree felony charge 
22 of child abuse. A presentence report has been ordered now, 
23 received and reviewed. Mr. Buividas, you've seen the report 
24 have you not? 
25 MR. BUIVIDAS: We have, your Honor. 
th 
1 I THE COURT: Is there any legal reason known to you why 
2 I should not proceed with sentencing at this time? 
3 MR. BUIVIDAS: I don't have any legal reasons. I do 
4 have a couple concerns about this report, if I may. The last 
5 two sentences — 
6 THE COURT: Well, we'll deal with your opportunity to 
7 challenge the accuracy of the report in a moment, but you know 
8 of no legal reason why we shouldn't impose sentence? 
9 MR. BUIVTDAS: No, your Honor. Okay. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Then before I do so, do you 
11 wish to say anything on behalf of your client? 
12 MR. BUIVTDAS: Yes, your Honor. The last two sentences 
! i 
13 of the evaluator's summary bother me a great deal, if I may 
14 disclose that. It says, "It should be noted ~ * 
15 THE COURT: What page are you referring to? 
16 MR. BUIVTDAS: It will be page 16 of the defendant's 
17 presentence report. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, and the last paragraph, last two 
19 sentences? 
20 MR. BUIVTDAS: Two sentences of that. "It should 
21 be noted the defendant would be considered an appropriate 
22 candidate for probation after a lengthy jail period or a 
23 period of jail. However, this agency's options are now 
24 limited, knowing that INS plans on deporting the defendant," 
25 and then they recommend prison. 
I -4 
1 I'm extremely bothered by it and I attempted to call 
2 the person that did this report, Stacy Smith, but she's out of 
3 the office until the 18th. I do know the State's planning on 
4 recommending a year in jail in this case, and I think that 
5 would be an appropriate resolution. 
6 If the Court is strongly leaning towards prison, then 
7 I'd ask for some more time to at least talk to the officer and 
8 get to the bottom of it. I think it's not a very good report 
9 here in that regard. 
10 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Buividas. Thank you. 
11 Mr. Acosta-Torres, before I decide what to do here, 
12 do you have anything to say? 
13 I MR. ACOSTA-TORRES: Yes, your Honor, I do. I promise 
14 you today and I would like to tell you that I did wrong, and 
15 I'm sorry for what I did and I will take responsibility for 
16 what I did. I also want to tell you that I have a beautiful 
17 family waiting for me at home, a beautiful daughter and wife, 
18 and they need me just as well as I need them, and I mean, 
19 physically, morally, mentally, economically. I'm sorry for 
20 what I did and I will take responsibility, whatever you think 
21 is going to help me better myself. Thank you, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Acosta-Torres. Thank you. 
23 Ms. Higgins, what is the State's position, and let me 
24 inquire further if we have anyone to speak on behalf of the 
25 victims? 
1 MS. HIGGINS: Your Honor, the grandmother called me 
2 this morning, grandmother of the victim, and said that they 
3 wanted to come but they could not because of a death in the 
4 family. So they are not here, but both the mother and the 
5 grandmother filled out victim impact statements. 
6 THE COURT: Yes, and I've seen those. 
7 I MS. HIGGINS: Your Honor, I have photos of the child, 
8 if I may approach. 
9 I THE COURT: Yes, you may. Well, let's see, I have a 
10 victim impact statement from the mother and grandmother, and 
11 these are photos here. 
12 I MS. HIGGINS: The State is recommending one year and 
13 deportation. 
14 THE COURT: All right, Counsel, Ms. Higgins. 
15 MR. BUIVIDAS: Let me add, your Honor, you know, he's 
16 going to be deported, it looks like. If that happens, if he 
17 comes back in the country, he's going to prison for the re-
18 entry. The Court can still throw him in prison if he comes 
19 back. I know a lot of good prisons, and it's going to tie up 
20 resources of the State. 
21 He is trying to make in jail there, make the best use 
22 of his time. If he can get his GED and high school diploma, 
23 he's planning on doing. That's probably the best thing the 
24 guy can do for himself at this point. He is taking some 
25 motivational classes on a weekly basis to discuss problems 
-6-
1 with other inmates. He's going to an LDS substance abuse — 
2 it's a 12-step program while he's in there on a regular basis. 
3 You know, he came here as a young child with his 
4 family. I guess it was either in his early teens or just 
5 prior to that, you know, and had he taken some stuff a couple 
6 of years ago as he should have, he wouldn't be getting deported 
7 now, but unfortunately that's because, as the juvenile record 
8 reflects, he has a lack of responsibility in a certain regard. 
9 The juvenile record there, he seems to think that a 
10 couple of the things are duplicates, and that may well be true. 
11 With all of the arrests, sometimes they put them on the same. 
12 His biggest problem as a juvenile, he ran away from home, so 
13 they ended up putting him in a proctor home, and he'd keep 
14 coming back to Court on that regard. 
15 He has to learn from all this, your Honor. I don't 
16 know what's going to teach him anything more important. His 
17 family is here. He's got a very good family. They've been 
18 100 percent supportive in trying to help him out and doing what 
19 they could to help him. His mother would like to address the 
20 Court, if that's okay. No? Okay. 
21 THE COURT: No. I'll hear from victims, but I don't 
22 hear from relatives of defendants. 
23 MR. BUIVIDAS: Okay, I kind of thought that might be 
24 the case. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
-7-
1 I MR. BUIVIDAS: But anyway, we would just ask for a year 
2 of jail — or even, you know, if the Court's inclined, credit 
3 for time served that he has done. He has done 155 days. He 
4 has taken responsibility. 
5 J I know that those pictures are awful and they're very 
6 serious. I think we're grateful, according to the reports 
7 here, that there's been no permanent injury or serious injury 
8 to the child other than what you see on the pictures there, 
9 which is not minimizing one bit, but it appears the baby — 
10 everything is on track for the baby, and he's been extremely 
11 sorrowful, and his whole time in jail he has mourned. 
12 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Buividas. There being no 
13 legal reason why I should not impose sentence, I will do so at 
14 this time, Mr. Acosta-Torres. It is the judgment and sentence 
15 of this Court that you serve the term provided by law in the 
16 Utah State Prison of 1 to 15 years for the second-degree felony 
17 charge for which you have pled. I will order moreover that you 
18 pay as restitution any and all counseling and/or medical 
19 expenses incurred by this victim or the mother of the victim. 
20 Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not of the view that the 
21 recommendation from APSP is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone 
22 that would beat up on a child of this nature, in my estimation, 
23 really needs some serious thinking time, and I am concerned 
24 that you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and 
25 endanger some other innocent victim out in society. 
-8 
I'm therefore of the view, Mr. Acosta-Torres, that you 
ought to be committed to the Utah State Prison, and I'll order 
that that be accomplished forthwith. I will grant you credit 
for the 155 days that you've now served awaiting disposition of 
this matter, and you can take while you're there, if you're 
able and inclined to do so, anger management training and 
classes. Good luck to you. Thank you, Counsel. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
